Review of: Emerging from Meditation by Yusa, Michiko
Western Washington University
Western CEDAR
Modern & Classical Languages Humanities
7-1992
Review of: Emerging from Meditation
Michiko Yusa
Western Washington University, michiko.yusa@wwu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://cedar.wwu.edu/mcl_facpubs
Part of the Japanese Studies Commons, and the Modern Languages Commons
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Humanities at Western CEDAR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Modern &
Classical Languages by an authorized administrator of Western CEDAR. For more information, please contact westerncedar@wwu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Yusa, Michiko, "Review of: Emerging from Meditation" (1992). Modern & Classical Languages. 21.
https://cedar.wwu.edu/mcl_facpubs/21
that the order of judicial decisions does not lie so much in a body of 
doctrines, but rather in a relationship between these decisions and the 
social construction of which they are a part. The q.adfs discretion turns 
out to be far more limited than might at first appear, albeit in different 
ways than we are familiar with from Anglo-American common law, 
European civil law, or Roman canon law. Although the emphasis of 
Islamic law is on the individual, the way in which individuals are legally 
constituted is important and quite distinctive. The aim of the qadJis to 
get people back into the process of negotiating their own social arrange- 
ments without exceeding divine rules. Although pragmatic consider- 
ations clearly come in here, it would be a mistake to regard Islamic law 
as less logical in organization than any other legal system. It is just that 
the emphasis of its systematization lies in maintaining the rules of every- 
day life rather than internal structure. 
Rosen's argument is exceptionally interesting and well-constructed. 
Although his main thesis is quite simple, he uses it to try to make sense 
of a great variety of detail about actual cases, and he continually com- 
pares the decisions of his qadT in Morocco with those of other legal 
authorities in other systems. This is the first detailed and contemporary 
analysis of the workings of an Islamic court. It sheds light on many of the 
theoretical discussions of Islamic jurisprudence with which those inter- 
ested in Islam are acquainted, and it brings out nicely the way in which 
judges seek to balance social and religious aims. It is often said that these 
aims go together in Islamic societies, but Rosen's painstaking analysis of 
the role which ethnic and political differences play in Moroccan society 
suggests that it is not enough to expect state and religion to be reconciled 
through the decisions of the qadJI. He is operating in a highly complex and 
diverse context, and Rosen is careful not to try to pigeonhole the charac- 
ter of his decisions with undue precision. The main thesis that the deci- 
sions of the qad/Tare far from arbitrary is well demonstrated in this book. 
We are reminded through both books that there is an intimate relation- 
ship between law and society, and we cannot investigate one without 
also concerning ourselves with the other. 
Emerging from Meditation. By Tominaga Nakamoto. Translated with an 
introduction by Michael Pye. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990. 
'SJ3X X Pp. ix + 214. $35.00. 
Reviewed by This volume contains an English translation of Okina no fumi (Writings of 
Michiko Yusa an Old Man) (1746) and Shutsujo-kogo (Emerging from Meditation) (1745), 
Western Washington by Tominaga Nakamoto (1715-1746), preceded by the translator's Intro- 
University duction and followed by a Note on the editions used, the Conventions 
adopted in translation, a Bibliography, and Indexes of writings and char- 
Philosophy East & West acters for titles of writings and other names. 
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Pye's translation assertively brings onto the Western academic stage 
a free and critical thinker, Tominaga Nakamoto-an unexpected but by 
no means unusual product of Tokugawa Japan, as Pye makes clear in his 
Introduction-who has hitherto been given very little attention by the 
majority of modern scholars both in Japan and overseas. Tominaga was 
what we today call a historian of religions and ideas, and a highly contro- 
versial figure of his time. He approached Buddhism, Confucianism, and 
Shinto (and, to a much lesser extent, Daoism) with his theory of historical 
development of religious traditions, which he called kajo, "adding [to the 
existent tradition] and superceding [it]." That is, "those who preach a 
moral way and establish a law of life ... tried to emerge above those who 
went before," as aptly quoted by Pye (p. 3). 
In the Introduction, Pye applies a "pratitya-samutpadic" or "geo- 
socio-economic-historical" approach to the investigation of ideas, an 
approach buttressed by an awareness that ideas, just like everything else, 
are radically interrelated and interlocked in their given space and time. 
Following the discussion of the prominent aspects of Tominaga's histori- 
cal method and his theory of the relative nature of language (pp. 1-7), his 
biography (pp. 7-13), and the intellectual context of his time (pp. 13-18), 
Pye carefully sketches the socioeconomic background which made it 
possible for free thinkers such as Tominaga to appear in the commer- 
cial town of Osaka in the first half of the eighteenth century in Japan 
(pp. 18-24). He then demonstrates the lack of Western (that is, European) 
influence on the formation of critical and rational thinking in Japan at the 
time Tominaga was writing (pp. 24-30). Pye's analytical skill shines forth 
as he turns to the East Asian intellectual tradition at large and demon- 
strates that it had sufficient reasons of its own to prepare the way for the 
birth of critical and rational thinking (pp. 30-38). Following his discussion 
of the influence of Tominaga's works on his contemporaries and the 
subsequent generations of Japanese thinkers (pp. 38-47), Pye assesses 
the significance of Tominaga's thought in terms of "the history of ideas in 
general" in that it "arrived at an intellectual attitude... markedly parallel 
in its main principles to that of the European Enlightenment," while 
Tominaga's thought is "organically related to Asian intellectual tradi- 
tions." These two Japanese and European "intellectual worlds," however, 
remained entirely autonomous (p. 46). Pye's observation shifts the per- 
spective from a Eurocentric one to one of a rore global scope. 
The first translated text, Writings of an Old Man (pp. 48-70), is short, 
concise, and easy to read. No doubt, Tominaga had the wider general 
audience in mind when he wrote it. In this work, Tominaga puts to his 
historical criticism Buddhism, Confucianism, and Shinto. His aim in part 
seems to recover their original teachings-or the timeless truth con- 
tained within them. This is none other than what he calls the "way of 
truth" (makoto no michi), of which he was a follower, rather than these 
three established traditions (see p. 52). This "way of truth," Tominaga 
Bn? 
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describes, "is simply to perform our evident duty in everything, to give 
priority to the tasks of the day, to maintain an upright heart and correct 
conduct, to be restrained in speech and bearing, and, if we have parents, 
to serve and honor them well" (p. 57). Clearly emphasized here is the 
moral conduct of individual persons. Section 10 of the Writings (pp. 61- 
64) contains his critique of the Buddhist tradition, and this in fact is a 
brief summary of his earlier and much more extensive work, Emerging 
from Meditation. 
The second translated text in this volume, Emerging from Meditation 
and then Speaking (pp. 71-183), is a detailed, technical discussion of the 
historical development of Buddhism and its various teachings, in twenty- 
five chapters. Tominaga views the historical development of sects, 
streams, and various teachings of Buddhism in terms of the principle of 
"adding and superceding" (kajo). In this connection, he maintains a 
pluralistic hermeneutical stance which admits that various teachings 
need not necessarily be harmonized, for they are varying interpretations, 
all viable, arising from the process of the attempt by human beings to 
approximate the Buddha's teaching (see p. 147). With his historical per- 
spective, Tominaga demythologizes many claims, such as the Mahayana 
sutras containing the direct words of Sakyamuni Buddha (chap. 3). He 
sees the date of the Buddha's appearance to be uncertain (chap. 23), the 
theory of eight consciousnesses to have arisen out of mistranslations of 
the six consciousnesses (chap. 12), the Zen claim for the lineage of the 
transmission of the Dharma to have been something that got started with 
Chiko (Zhiju, 534-606), a compiler of records of Zen masters (chap. 20), 
and so forth. Another marked feature of Tominaga's approach is his 
concern for the practical. He criticizes the legalistic tendencies that 
developed through the course of history, such as the prohibition of 
meat-eating (chap. 16), a hypocritical attitude toward marriage found in 
the scriptures (chap. 15), and a strict verbatim observance of the precepts 
(chap. 14). Nakamura Hajime's observation that Tominaga was a warm- 
hearted humanitarian merits our attention (see Nakamura Hajime, Kindai 
Nihon no hihanteki seishin [Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1965], pp. 202-205). 
After reading the texts, especially Emerging from Meditation, one 
cannot help but wonder what modern Buddhologists would have to say 
about the scholarship of Tominaga. Unfortunately, the translator does not 
discuss this point. "Accuracies and Inaccuracies of Tominaga's Under- 
standing of Buddhism" and "Tominaga's Textual Sources" would have 
been helpful discussions to be included in the translator's Introduction. 
As for the translation, it is generally accurate, and Pye's commentary 
by way of footnotes is helpful (see p. 48 n. 4, and p. 147 n. 134). One only 
wishes that his commentaries were more extensive. Typographical and 
other minor errors are few: "Murg5yi" (p. 76, line 23) should read 
Philosophy East & West "Mury6gi"; "Lanrkavatara" (p. 139, line 12) should read "Shury6gon"; 
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"After The Buddha-dharma" (p. 141, line 25) should read "After the 
Buddha-dharma"; and "Hayashi Chuho, surnamed Shi Ryo" (p 153, line 4) 
should read "Hayashi Chuho, given name Shiryo" (the given name is most 
likely pronounced not "Shiryo" but Mitsuyoshi, Kazuyoshi, Noriyoshi, or 
Moroyoshi). "Farce acting" (p. 70) should be rendered "No play," as the 
original reads sarugaku and not ky6gen (sarugaku was a term used by 
Zeami to refer to the art of No). Regarding the translation of Confucius' 
saying (bottom of p. 144), the insertion of "Good and evil are" distorts the 
original. It should read "human nature is alike; by practice it becomes far 
apart" (The Analects 17.2). To translate the Japanese "ushu" as "Sarvas- 
tivada" in wholesale fashion is questionable (p. 114 and also p. 141, at the 
head of chap. 17). On page 82, the word "ushu" indeed corresponds 
to the Sarvastivada, but it is also a word of generic reference to those 
schools which stood against the schools of "emptiness," and it seems 
that the latter was meant on pages 114 and 141. 
A final word on the convention of translation of proper names that 
Pye has adopted: it would have rendered the finished English texts much 
more smooth if Chinese proper names had been written in pinyin or some 
other accepted romanization system instead of transliterating them ac- 
cording to their Japanese pronunciations. Pye notes that "An exception 
is made for well-known names such as those of the Chinese Buddhists Fa 
Hsien and Hsuan Tsang" (p. 188), but a question remains: "'Well-known' 
to whom?" (Moreover, I noticed a few cases of inconsistencies in the 
handling of proper names-Xun Zi, for instance, is given as "Junshi [Hsun 
Tzu]" on p. 144, and as "Hsun Tzu" on pp. 65, 69, 137.) Similarly, Sanskrit 
words would have been better-off re-Sanskritized. Pye is careful to give 
his reasons for not doing so: "for this would have been alien to the flavor 
of Tominaga's works. It would also have been contrary to the principles 
expressed in Writings of an Old Man!" (p. 188) (Pye is referring to the view 
advocated by Tominaga, which, to put it somewhat simplistically, is: 
"When in Rome, do as the Romans do"). Indeed, by keeping Tominaga's 
eighteenth-century Japanese scholarly conventions, the translator has 
successfully managed to retain the flavor of an old-fashioned scholarship, 
but at the price of obscuring the text unnecessarily for a contemporary 
reader of English. I do not think that Tominaga, who was critically aware 
of linguistic conditions (that a word has a semantic scope, changes with 
time, and is used in accordance with the intention of a person-see 
pp. 120-123), would have opposed writing Chinese and Indian names 
and terms in a way that would have been in accordance with today's 
conventions. Otherwise, why did he ridicule the Shintoists of his day, who 
adhered to what appeared to him to be antiquated customs? (see p. 56). 
If I understand Tominaga's spirit correctly, he would have been the first 
to say: "Be expedient and practical, my colleague!" 
In conclusion: Professor Pye has brought to our attention an impor- Book Reviews 
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tant thinker whose works have unfairly lain in obscurity. The present 
volume is a must for anyone who is interested in the history of religions 
in general, Japanese religions in particular, or Buddhism. Both Pye's ap- 
proach and Tominaga's works are thought-provoking and rich in content, 
and that makes this book an interesting choice for a graduate seminar. 
As a critique of Buddhism, the work will be especially useful when read 
together with the extensive textual annotations found in volume 1 of 
Gendai Bukkyo meicho zenshu, edited by Nakamura Hajime, Masutani 
Fumio, and J. M. Kitagawa (Tokyo: Ryubunkan, 1971) (pp. 149-504), and 
with Nakamura's essays in the aforementioned volume, Kindai Nihon no 
hihanteki seishin. 
Philosophy and the Self: East and West. By Troy Wilson Organ. Selins- 
grove: Associated University Presses, 1987. Pp. viii + 239. 
Reviewed by 
Dale Riepe 
SUNY/Buffalo 
Philosophy East & West 
Troy Organ is a distinguished scholar of wide experience in Indian educa- 
tional institutions and in American colleges and universities. This is his 
tenth book and a successor to his work on Indian philosophy of the self. 
Organ has been a true seeker of wisdom and brings to light new oppor- 
tunities for Westerners and Indians to develop their sensitivities in per- 
sonal ethics. In the forty-two years I have known him he has shown an 
experimental attitude toward life and has refused to be satisfied with any 
shibboleths of the ethical life. 
The book has six chapters, each one dealing with human beings as 
vibrant choice-makers. They deal with the human being as philosopher, 
speaker, knower, self-knower, as a student of theories of the self, and as 
an agent of self-realization. 
Organ is especially sensitive to the problem of understanding the 
East. To this end he has given many hints through the words of students 
of Eastern philosophy who also know something about the West. Wing- 
tsit Chan is quoted as pointing out that the main thrust of Chinese 
philosophy is humanism. Since the Renaissance, Western philosophy has 
been more or less dominated by man's attempt to understand and 
controlthe external world. Domination became a major theme in West- 
ern practice as we have seen in the age of imperialism. A major absence 
in Organ's work is its Eastern-like evasion of political questions. By search- 
ing the inner man, the East has largely closed its eyes to the devastating 
effects of nations exploiting each other and their own inhabitants. This is 
also a criticism of Aristotle despite his awareness that ethics is a branch 
of politics. Hegel points out that Aristotle was so enmired in his establish- 
ment that he seemed to think that everything worthwhile had to be done 
through individual effort within the establishment. 
On the other hand it is a great relief for us to glide along in the canoe 
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